

Appendix to

**The American Public and the Room to Maneuver:
Responsibility Attributions and Policy Efficacy in an Era of Globalization**

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Appendix 1. Survey Design and Questions

The survey design is divided into two parts. Part I is an assessment of priming effects with respect to citizen assessments of the room to maneuver. Part II is an analysis of the reasoning and satisfaction of citizens who indicate the room to maneuver does (not) exist. Percentages in brackets in part one indicate the size of each of the eight randomly-assigned subsamples provided by the research design. The numbers of respondents assigned to each condition were not always exactly—but did approximate—one-eighth of the sample each. The subsamples for part two of the experiment are constructed from the responses in part one as indicated. Respondents were not explicitly offered “none,” “don’t know,” or “refuse to answer” options. However, if they volunteered one of these responses, they were recorded in the data set and no follow up question attempt to elicit a fuller response was asked. In part one, at most 2 respondents answered None or Don’t Know to any question. The numbers of these responses were slightly higher in part two. In the questions for Believers in Room to Maneuver, the maximum number of Don’t Know responses was 8 and the maximum number of refusals was 5—for Q2.12 (N=296); in part two the maximum Don’t Knows was 7 and Refuse to Answers was one—to Q2.21 (N=82).

Stage 1. The Responsibility Attribution Experiment

1.1 *Variation in choices, responsibility attribution*

[12.5%] Q1.11 Please tell me who you feel is most responsible for the economic conditions in the United States in the last few years. Is it:¹

- A. The Congress
- B. The President
- C. Working People
- D. Business People

[12.5%] Q1.12 Please tell me who you feel is most responsible for the economic conditions in the United States in the last few years. Is it:

- A. The Congress
- B. The President
- C. Working people
- D. Business people
- E. National and international business cycles

1.2 *Variation in question wording (international economic forces), responsibility attribution*

[12.5%] Q1.21 In terms of trade and finance, the United States now is deeply involved in the world economy. In view of this, who is most responsible for the economic conditions in our country in the last few years. Is it:

- A. The Congress
- B. The President

¹ The order in which the substantive response options were offered was randomized for Q1.11, Q1.12, Q1.21, and Q1.22.

- C. Working people
- D. Business people

[12.5%] Q1.22 In terms of trade and finance, the United States now is deeply involved in the world economy. In view of this, who is most responsible for the economic conditions in our country in the last few years. Is it:

- A. The Congress
- B. The President
- C. Working people
- D. Business people
- E. National and international business cycles

1.3 Replication of question on British Election Panel Study for U.S. with and without reference to international economic forces

[12.5%] Q1.31 How much influence do you think the American government has on America's economy? Does the American government have a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or hardly any influence?

- A. A great deal
- B. Quite a lot
- C. Not very much
- D. Hardly any

[12.5%] Q1.32 In today's worldwide economy, how much influence do you think the American government has on America's economy? Does the American government have a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or hardly any influence?

- A. A great deal
- B. Quite a lot
- C. Not very much
- D. Hardly any

1.4 Replication of question from Social Survey (Gallup Poll) Ltd. Great Britain with and without reference to international economic forces

[12.5%] Q1.41 Some people say that American governments nowadays—of whichever party—can actually do very little to change things. Others say they can do quite a bit.

Q1.411. Do you think that American governments nowadays can do very little or quite a bit to keep prices down?

- A. Very little
- B. Quite a bit

Q1.412. Do you think that American governments nowadays can do very little or quite a bit to reduce unemployment?

- A. Very little
- B. Quite a bit

Q1.413. World trade causes some American workers to lose their jobs. Do you think the American government can do very little or quite a bit to help these workers?

- A. Very little
- B. Quite a bit

[12.5%]Q1.42. Some people say that because of the influence of the world economy that American governments nowadays—of whichever party—can actually do very little to change things. Others say they can do quite a bit.

Q1.421. Do you think that American governments nowadays can do very little or quite a bit to keep prices down?

- A. Very little
- B. Quite a bit

Q1.422. Do you think that American governments nowadays can do very little or quite a bit to reduce unemployment?

- A. Very little
- B. Quite a bit

Q1.423. World trade causes some American workers to lose their jobs. Do you think the American government can do very little or quite a bit to help these workers?

- A. Very little
- B. Quite a bit

Stage 2. The Room to Maneuver Experiment

2.1 *Citizens who affirm that American governments still retain room to maneuver in the world economy* (Subsample of those who gave responses: Q1.11 (A,B), Q1.12 (A,B), Q1.21 (A,B), Q1.22 (A,B), Q1.31 (A,B), Q1.32 (A,B); at least one of Q1.4.11, Q1.4.12, Q1.4.13 (B) and, at the same time, to the others, Don't Know; at least one of Q1.4.21, Q1.4.22, Q1.4.23 (B) and, at the same time, to the others, Don't Know.²

Q2.11 Some people say in response to international economic forces, our government should do more to manage prices, create jobs, and help people whose livelihood is affected by trade. Others say that the government does too much already. Which of these three statements best describes what you think?

- A. Our government should do more nationally
- B. The amount of government involvement in the national economy is about right
- C. The government does too much already

Q2.12 Which political party do you think does the best job of making economic policy for the world economy? Would you say the Democrats, the Republicans, or do both parties do an equally good job?

- A. The Democrats
- B. The Republicans
- C. Both parties do an equally good job

Q2.13 Alan Greenspan is the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System; he oversees the making of monetary policy. But we don't elect Alan Greenspan. He is appointed. Some people think that, in view of the important role the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System plays in responding to the world economy, people should elect this person. Do you agree or disagree that people should elect the head of the Federal Reserve?³

- A. Strongly agree⁴
- B. Somewhat agree
- C. Somewhat disagree
- D. Strongly disagree

Q2.14. How satisfied are you when it comes to the way our democracy works in holding our officials accountable for the way they manage our economy through elections? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not too satisfied, or not at all satisfied?

- A. Very satisfied
- B. Somewhat satisfied

² For question Q1.42, to be included in this second part of the experiment, if respondents answer B to only one of the three subitems, then the same individuals must answer Don't know to the other two. In other words Believers in Room to maneuver must not give any conflicting answers among the three subitems.

³ If asked to define monetary policy, interviewers were instructed to say, "Monetary policy is the process of managing a nation's money supply to achieve specific goals – such as constraining inflation, achieving full employment or more well-being." If respondents asked about the pending appointment of Ben Bernanke as Federal Reserve Chairperson, they were reminded that at the time of the survey, Alan Greenspan still served as Chairperson.

⁴ This was a branching question in which respondents were first asked whether they agreed or disagreed and then asked a follow-up question regarding the strength of their agreement [disagreement].

- C. Not too satisfied
- D. Not at all satisfied

2.2 *Citizens who do not believe American governments have room to maneuver in the world economy* (Subsample of those who gave responses: Q1.21 (CD), Q1.22(CDE), Q1.32 (CD); at least one of Q1.4.21, Q1.4.22, Q1.4.23 (A) and, at the same time, to the others Don't Know.⁵

Q2.21. International investors and traders seem to want the United States' federal budget deficit to be about three per cent of our national income and inflation in our country to be about two percent. Suppose our government tried to achieve some different economic goals, say by increasing government spending and making our deficit bigger than three per cent. Which of these is more likely to happen—more government spending would REDUCE the number of jobs in our country, or more government spending would INCREASE the number of jobs in our country?

- A. More jobs would reduce the number of jobs in our country
- B. More government spending would increase the number of jobs in our country
- C. Depends on how it is spent

Q2.22. Which political party do you think does the best job of making economic policy for the world economy? Would you say the Democrats, the Republicans, or do both parties do an equally good job?

- A. The Democrats
- B. The Republicans
- C. Both parties do an equally good job

Q2.23. Some say that the world economy strongly encourages our government to make good policies. Others say that the world economy strongly encourages our government to make policies that harm the American people. Which is closer to your opinion? Number one: The world economy strongly encourages our government to make GOOD policies, Number two: The world economy strongly encourages our government to make policies that HARM the American people.

- A. World economy encourages our government to make good policies
- B. World economy encourages our government to make policies that harm the American People

Q2.24. When it comes to holding our elected officials accountable for the way they handle issues like trade—say through elections, are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not too satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way our democracy works in holding officials accountable for the way they manage our economy?

⁵ For Questions 1.42, these respondents must give at least one A response and for these same individuals the other responses both must be "Don't Know."

- A. Very satisfied
- B. Somewhat satisfied
- C. Not too satisfied
- D. Not at all satisfied

Appendix 2. TESS Survey Sample Comparison

Table A1 compares the TESS sample to the U.S. adult population. The U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics provide monthly estimates of the national population through the Current Population Survey (CPS). We calculate a percent deviation for each categorical value and aggregate this into an average deviation for each variable. The total average deviation across the seven demographic categories is four percent. The sample slightly overrepresents those with a college degree and slightly underrepresents those with incomes below \$25,000 a year. However, given that the TESS sample is relatively small, 514 respondents, a four percent total average deviation demonstrates the sample is quite representative of the U.S. adult population.⁶ Finally, note that subjects are well-dispersed in their partisan leanings, with 34% identifying themselves as Republican and 32% as Democrat.

⁶ Only 492 respondents provided information about their level of household income.

Table A1. Comparison of the National Population and the Survey Sample (%s)

		Adult U.S. Population	TESS Sample	Absolute Deviation
Gender	Male	48.9	44.2	4.7
	Female	51.1	55.8	4.7
	<i>Average Deviation</i>			4.7
Age	18-24	12.7	6.0	6.7
	25-34	17.9	13.1	4.8
	35-44	19.6	17.9	1.7
	45-54	19.5	23.9	4.4
	55-64	14.1	18.3	4.2
	65 or older	16.2	20.8	4.6
	<i>Average Deviation</i>			4.4
Education	No HS diploma	19.8	6.8	13.0
	HS diploma	30.2	25.7	4.5
	Some college	18.1	19.9	1.8
	Associate degree	7.8	8.6	0.8
	College degree	24.1	39.0	14.9
	<i>Average Deviation</i>			7.0
Income	< \$25,000	23.5	15.5	8.0
	\$25,000 – 49,999	27.6	27.6	0.0
	\$50,000 – 74,999	20.0	22.4	2.4
	≥ \$75,000	28.9	34.5	5.6
	<i>Average Deviation</i>			4.0
Marriage	Married	53.5	59.1	5.6
	Not Married	46.5	40.9	5.6
	<i>Average Deviation</i>			5.6
Race	White	80.3	76.1	4.2
	Non-white	19.7	23.9	4.2
	<i>Average Deviation</i>			4.2
Region	Midwest	22.3	26.3	4.0
	Northeast	18.4	19.6	1.2
	South	36.2	36.2	0.0
	West	23.1	17.9	5.2
	<i>Average Deviation</i>			2.6
Total				4.0
Average				
Deviation				

* CPS data available at <http://www.census.gov/cps/>

Source: 2005 TESS Study and Current Population Study (January 2006)

Appendix 3. Additional Data Analyses

This section reports results for additional data analyses designed to assess the extent to which estimates reported in the main text are sensitive to sample included, measurement, and/or estimation technique. Table A2 presents estimates from a multinomial logit model of responsibility attributions. Independent variables are the same as those used in Table 3 in the main text. It differs from Table 3 in that the data are from TESS Groups 1 and 3 instead of TESS Groups 2 and 4. This means that the model includes only four response options: the “national and international business cycles” response was not provided as an option to subjects in these two groups. Table A3 reports results of the expected probabilities for the four-choice model. It uses the same simulation and counterfactual experiments employed in Table 4 in the main text.

Table A2. MNL Estimates of Responsibility without National and International Business Cycles response option

	Congress / President	Working People / President	Business People / President
Partisanship	.448** (.174)	.452 (.376)	.201 (.163)
Age Cohort	.189 (.287)	-.053 (.444)	.175 (.278)
Knowledge	.671** (.329)	1.194** (.469)	.936** (.300)
Δ Unemployment	-1.592 (1.192)	-2.195 (1.925)	.113 (.961)
PID x Δ Unemployment	.314 (.308)	.143 (.460)	-.037 (.238)
Constant	-2.486** (.918)	-5.193** (1.330)	-1.707* (.927)
N	137		
Wald χ^2 statistic	69.54**		
Pseudo R2	.08		

Source: 2005 TESS study

Note: Model is identical to Table 3 in the main text except that it includes only four response options. The “national and international business cycles” option is not provided. Data are from TESS Groups 1 and 3. Cells report multinomial logit estimates with standard errors clustered according to state in parentheses.⁷ The President is the reference category. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, 2-tailed tests.

⁷ As we did for the model presented in Table 3 of the main text, we tested the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption made by multinomial logit (MNL) models using seemingly unrelated estimation tests. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that the MNL coefficients are statistically indistinguishable across the two models, indicating that IIA holds. See fn. 22 in main text for additional information.

Table A3. Expected Probabilities of Responsibility Attributions, Four Choice Model

	Congress	President	Working People	Business People
<i>Partisanship</i>				
Strong Republican	.46** (.10)	.14** (.05)	.11 (.09)	.30** (.07)
Strong Democrat	.23** (.06)	.45** (.07)	.03 (.02)	.30** (.07)
First Difference	-.23* (.13)	.31** (.09)	-.08 (.10)	-.01 (.11)
<i>Age</i>				
Youngest Cohort (≤ 39 years)	.33** (.06)	.30** (.06)	.06** (.03)	.31** (.06)
Oldest Cohort (≥ 60 years)	.37** (.07)	.23** (.07)	.05 (.04)	.34** (.06)
First Difference	.05 (.09)	-.06 (.10)	-.01 (.05)	.03 (.09)
<i>Knowledge</i>				
Low (≤ high school degree)	.31** (.07)	.44** (.08)	.03 (.03)	.22** (.06)
High (≥ 4-yr college degree)	.35** (.07)	.14** (.05)	.09** (.02)	.42** (.07)
First Difference	.04 (.11)	-.30** (.09)	.05 (.04)	.21** (.10)

Note: Table entries are the expected probabilities of each responsibility attribution given specified row variable with standard errors in parentheses. Cell entries are obtained by manipulating the value of the row variable while holding all other variable values to the following: *Partisanship* = 4 (Independent), *Age Cohort* = 1 (40-59 years), *Knowledge* = 1 (some post-secondary education), and $\Delta Unemployment$ at its in-sample mean. Using CLARIFY (King et al 2000), we then calculate the mean and standard deviation of the predicted probabilities by taking 1000 draws from the multivariate normal distribution of the estimated parameters from Table A2. ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$.

Table A4 reports alternative specifications for Table 7, which predicts the attributes of those subjects who do and do not believe their government has room to maneuver. In Table 7, we used the decision rules detailed in section 4.1 of the text. This design produces 82 out of 375 (22%) who are classified as non-believers in the room to maneuver. We then estimated a binary probit model where the dependent variable equals 1 for the 82 Non-Believers and 0 for the 296 believers. This practice, however, raises two potential concerns. First, how do we handle those subjects who are not classified either as non-believers or as believers? Second, our design consciously errs on the side of assigning fewer rather than more subjects to the non-believer category. What are the consequences of doing so?

Models in Table A4 are performed with the objective of addressing these questions. First we address the question of how to handle subjects who were not randomly selected to receive one of the questions necessary for assignment as a non-believer. These were primarily subjects assigned to TESS Groups 1, 2, 5, and 7.⁸ In the first model we handle these subjects as an effective third category and estimate a model of multinomial choice predicting whether the subject is a believer, non-believer, or neither.⁹ We report coefficients and marginal effects for the non-believer/believer contrast only in Model 1 of Table A4. Model 2 includes interaction terms between partisanship and age as well as partisanship and knowledge. A comparison with Table 7 marginal effects reveals very little difference, suggesting that omitting this “residual” group of subjects has no effect on statistical inference.

As a further check, we simply pool these formerly omitted subjects into our binary probit specification. Instead of placing them in a third category, we assign these subjects from Groups 1, 2, 5, and 7, to the non-believers group. This arguably is justified on grounds that if given the opportunity, these subjects would be highly likely to be identified as non-believers. Results of this model are reported as Model 3 in Table A4. Model 4 includes interaction terms between partisanship and age as well as partisanship and knowledge. Again, substantive effects are nearly identical to those reported in Table 7.

⁸ Additionally, a respondent was not assigned to either the believer or non-believer category if he or she did not respond to the Stage 2 questions. As such, these few respondents would also be a part of the third category of unassigned respondents.

⁹ Subjects placed in the third category are those who were randomly assigned to Groups 1 and 2 who attributed responsibility for economic conditions either to business people or to working people; subjects in Group 5 who, despite receiving no “world economy” prime, said that the American government has “not very much” or “hardly any” influence over America’s economy; subjects in Group 7 who answered negative to the multi-part question. (See also, footnote 8.)

Table A4. Alternative Specifications for Table 7

	Model 1 ^a	Model 2 ^a	Model 3 ^b	Model 4 ^b
Partisanship (high = Republican)	.106** (.027)	.073 (.063)	.162** (.073)	-.145 (.183)
Age Cohort	-.046 (.078)	-.097 (.164)	.218 (.207)	-.374 (.439)
Knowledge	.254** (.070)	.182 (.149)	.573** (.192)	.075 (.397)
Partisanship x Age Cohort		.013 (.037)		.150 (.099)
Partisanship x Knowledge		.018 (.033)		.129 (.090)
Group 3	.314* (.175)	.315* (.175)	3.448** (.498)	3.539** (.510)
Group 4	.858** (.185)	.862** (.186)	4.248** (.511)	4.388** (.530)
Group 8	.611** (.184)	.608** (.184)	2.588** (.575)	2.611** (.581)
Constant	-1.074** (.178)	-.942** (.287)	-5.132** (.660)	-4.017** (.871)
LR χ^2 statistic	60.89**	61.27**	228.62**	232.13**
Pseudo R ²	.09	.09	.23	.24
N	509	509	509	509

Note: Figures in parentheses report robust standard errors. * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, two-tailed test.

^a Dependent variable equals 0 for Believers in Room to Maneuver and 1 for Non-Believers in Room to Maneuver. Sample includes an expanded set of respondents in the Non-Believer category, as per discussion above.

^b Dependent variable equals 0 for Believers in Room to Maneuver, 1 for Non-Believers in Room to Maneuver (as defined in the text), and 2 for subjects not assigned to either category. For ease of presentation, table reports parameter estimates and marginal effects for the Non-Believer/Believers contrast only. Full model results available upon request.